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Abstract - Expectations about higher economic growth and the ever increasing demand for 
higher bandwidth and more reliable networks are driving the worldwide deployment of Next-
Generation Access (NGA) networks. The paths followed to achieve this goal markedly vary, 
however, across different countries. This paper offers a comparison of a handful of leading 
NGA deployments that rely on different investment models. We study the broadband national 
initiatives of New Zealand and Australia and a group of selected regional NGA deployments 
in Europe.  
While New Zealand’s approach partially relies on a Public-Private Partnership model of 
investment, Australia’s NBN is a wholly government-funded initiative and the European local 
initiatives in Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal use a range of mixed models of 
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investment. With these cases we aim to cover a large range of the spectrum of public and private 
modes of participation in infrastructure deployment.  
We have developed a common technology-policy-market framework that allows for a clear 
mapping of the incentives, goals and actions of those involved in network deployment. By 
using the framework we investigate the links between the choice of investment model, 
including the level of public and private involvement, and other factors that may contribute to 
the success (or not) of each NGA deployment. Our main interest is in the identification of the 
drivers for investment in the cases studied as well as the description of main risk factors in each 
case. By applying this framework to those selected deployment cases, while taking account of 
geographical characteristics and market structures, this work draws relevant conclusions about 
the impact of investment decisions on performance criteria such as coverage and uptake. 
Keywords – Next-Generation Access Networks, Fibre-to-the-Premises, Public investment in 
Broadband, Public-Private Partnership, New Zealand, Australia, Europe 
Introduction  
Current trends in increasing demand for faster and more reliable broadband (BB) connections 
stimulate the deployment of Next-Generation Access (NGA) networks. However, deploying 
new infrastructure, especially Fibre-to-the-Premises (FTTP), requires significant levels of 
investment. Different economic investment models are currently being used worldwide to steer 
the deployments, ranging from no government intervention (fully private deployment), to a 
collaboration of private companies and public actors in a Public-Private Partnership (PPP), to 
public procurement or even fully government-driven and publicly-operated rollout. 
Furthermore, variants in scale of deployment can be identified: small rural town initiatives, 
regional solutions or nationwide projects. 
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The nationwide PPP Ultra-Fast Broadband (UFB) network initiated by the government of New 
Zealand and the fully government-owned and funded Australian National Broadband Network 
(NBN) contrast sharply with the European local initiatives, which use mixed models of 
investment and are subject to constraints imposed on public money spending. Whereas the 
public partners (governments and local authorities) focus on increasing broadband coverage 
and stimulating the broadband ecosystem, private partners seek to establish a successful 
business case to the satisfaction of their shareholders. However a common aspect of the mixed 
deployment types is the alignment of goals by both public and private parties. 
The cases identified in this paper not only cover different sizes in the scale of deployment but 
insightfully cover the spectrum of public and private modes of participation in infrastructure 
deployment. With the latter in mind, we aim to reveal the relationship between indicators of 
goal achievement and the characteristics of the investment vehicles. For example, qualitatively 
finding and assessing a relationship between the estimated amounts of risk shifted onto a 
private partner and the speed of deployment. Thus, the paper defines a common framework for 
effective comparison of the above-mentioned country and regional cases. 
Inspired by (Melody, 2013) a Technology-Policy-Market interaction framework1 is proposed 
that allows for a clear mapping of the incentives, goals and actions of the different players in 
the field. Looking on the investment model used from a multi-domain perspective (technology, 
policy and the market) broadens our view and allows us to reach richer conclusions. This 
framework is applied to the following NGA deployment cases: New Zealand´s UFB, the 
publicly-owned dark fibre infrastructure provider Stokab in Stockholm (Sweden), the fully 
government-funded NBN project in Australia, a PPP under the Market Economy Investors 
                                                 




Principle in Amsterdam (the Netherlands), a PPP initiated by the community in Catalonia, 
Spain, and a private initiative undertaken by the different providers, mainly the incumbent, in 
Portugal. These cases were chosen because they represent different types of investment 
mechanisms and so they cover the range of investment models of interest.  
The goal of this paper is to investigate, on a case-to-case basis, the links between the choice of 
investment model, including the level of public and private involvement, and several factors 
that speak about the success of a NGA deployment. Then the paper identifies the drivers for 
investment in each case and the investment mechanism and looks into indicators relating to the 
main goals of the infrastructure deployment such as coverage and speed of deployment. As an 
important factor in the creation of incentives for private investment the paper also identifies 
the risk types shared between the partners across cases, whenever a partnership is the preferred 
vehicle for deployment. Placed on a straight segment with one end representing full 
government stewardship of a next-generation broadband access deployment and the other end 
representing fully private investment, the cases studied in this paper would sufficiently and 
variedly cover the space in between. Besides, their low number does not allow for a statistical 
approach to identifying correlation between factors and the measurement of interest. 
The paper unfolds as follows: after providing an introduction to PPPs and government 
intervention in broadband deployment, the technology, policy and market aspects are brought 
together in the interaction framework presented. Next, the UFB programme in New Zealand, 
the NBN in Australia, and regional initiatives in Europe are respectively described and 
analysed. Following comparison criteria are used to highlight the commonalities and 
differences in how those cases have performed thus far.  Conclusions and recommendations 
are formulated as a closure to the paper. 
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PPPs and government intervention in BB deployment 
This section presents a definition of the mechanism that allows a government to enter a 
partnership to undertake an infrastructure construction project and an overview of the range of 
options a government may rely upon when private participation is needed or preferred.  In 
addition it introduces concepts, key to the assessment of performance of those NGA 
deployments examined here. 
Although acceptance of FTTP as the preferred type of NGA deployment is not universal, the 
political decisions that have favoured deploying fibre to the customer look forward to future-
proof the access network with the most reliable and capable technology available today. 
Politics aside, when a type of greenfield NGA is to be deployed in urban or sub-urban areas, 
technology and demand factors have shown that FTTP is preferred2. As investment incentives 
for private operators to upgrade their networks to full fibre networks3 have been absent, some 
governments have tried alternative financial initiatives. These initiatives have included both 
private and public investment (financing structure), as well as different forms of “authority 
aid”, mainly in the form of laws or regulations. In this paper, we will mainly focus on the choice 
for and impact of the financing structure. Where deemed useful and to make the analysis 
relevant to policy makers, the paper also links the financial aspects to relevant regulatory 
decisions. 
                                                 
2 Van der Wee, M. et al., Identifying and quantifying the indirect benefits of broadband networks for e-
government and e-business: A bottom-up approach. 
3 With full fibre networks, we refer to Fibre-to-the-Premises (FTTP), also referred to as Fibre-to-the-Home 
(FTTH). We argue for this type of networks over upgrades on copper (DSL) or coaxial cable (DOCSIS) networks, 
as these upgrades gradually bring fibre closer to the home, but still leave a last part of legacy infrastructure. 
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Forms of public and private participation in infrastructure project 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the five main financing structures that can be identified for large 
projects (not limited to telecommunication networks deployments). They range from 100% 
public investment to 100% private investment: 
- In the complete government production and delivery, a public institution is responsible 
for the planning, deployment and maintenance of the project. 
- When a public party invests the funds, but outsources the execution (and possible 
operations or maintenance) of the project to private partners, the investments 
mechanism is referred to as public procurement. 
- A Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is characterized by both public and private 
investment, and hence, both public and private risk. This investment mechanism will 
be described in more detail further below. 
- The fourth mechanism is a concession, frequently also referred to as a tender. In this 
case, the public party grants a private partner the rights to deploy and operate an 
infrastructure (or to execute and maintain a project). The private partner relies on 
revenues from the project’s users, to recoup its investment. In this case, the private 
investment (and risk) is higher than in the case of a PPP. 
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Depending on the level of government involvement, different legal frameworks allow or forbid 
some of these investment mechanisms. In general, European policy holds that government 
intervention should only be allowed in cases where the market is not delivering the right quality 
and/or quantity. Lemstra and Groenewegen5 (2009) argue that governments should only 
intervene in case of a market failure, where it has been proven that the private market players 
have tried to correct the failure without any result. In this situation, the authorities can either 
use competition law to correct the abuse of market power, or set specific regulation on 
standards (quality of service) or impose price corrections through the use of taxes and subsidies. 
Here, it should be noted that the European regulation on public involvements is specified in 
specific terms, and hence significantly different from other parts in the world. More precisely, 
we refer to the distinction between white, grey and black areas (European Commission, 2009); 
in principle, only in white areas is public subsidy in network allowed. As an exception, there 
are two scenarios in which public investment is not regarded as State Aid in accordance with 
the Case-law of the European Communities (“ECJ”):  
- If the part of the investment that falls under the responsibility of the State can be used 
(in)directly by an undertaking in circumstances which correspond to normal market 
conditions, and,  
                                                 
4 Adapted from OECD, “Public-Private Partnerships, in pursuit of risk sharing and value for money.”  
5 Lemstra, W. & J. P. M. Groenewegen, “Markets and public values - The potential effects of Private Equity 
Leveraged Buyouts on the safeguarding of public values in the telecommunications sector”. 
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- If a Member State considers the provision of broadband as a service of general 
economic interest, known as a service of general economic interest (SGEI) as qualified 
by the Altmark6 criteria.  
Defining PPPs in the context of broadband expansion 
A PPP finds the middle point between public and private investment, and is defined as a 
contract between an authority (e.g. the national government or a municipality) and one or more 
private partners7. By including both public and private money, the alignment of objectives can 
be achieved: that is, the service-delivery objective of the public parties along with the profit-
maximization of the private parties8, making the agreement mutually beneficial and 
economical9. Another approach towards PPPs is seeing it as lying between the government and 
the market10, with the government representing centralized control of transactions and the 
market representing decentralized control.  
One key aspect that differentiates PPPs from traditional procurement models is the fact that the 
agreement involves a risk-transfer mechanism; i.e. the private partners in a PPP must bear an 
agreed share of the (financial) risk, and as such are incentivized to deliver the product as 
                                                 
6 The four conditions to meet in accordance with the Altmark criteria, as defined to in Article 86(2) of the Treaty 
of the European Community, are:  
a) the beneficiary of a State funding mechanism must be formally entrusted with the provision and discharge 
of a SGEI;  
b) the parameters for calculating the compensation must be established beforehand to avoid an economic 
advantage over competing undertakings;  
c) the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs, taking into account 
the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; and  
d) the level of compensation granted must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a 
typical undertaking, well run, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account 
the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. 
7 Ibid., 3.  
8 Fourie, F. and Burger, P., “An economic analysis and assessment of public-private partnerships (PPPs).” 
9 Tylee, D., “ISCR Conference. A participant’s perspective” 
10 Howell, B., “Meditating on Market Mechanisms.” 
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efficiently as possible. Thus PPPs are expected to deliver higher value-for-money by achieving 
the same goals as public procurement models, but at lower cost. 
On the other hand, the involvement of public money is also key and provides the main 
differentiator to privatised projects. Public money ensures that government can impose their 
coverage targets and can provide a type of “subsidy” to ensure the economic viability of the 
entire project. 
The OECD11 states that a well-established broadband deployment PPP must balance out four 
factors: 1. connectivity (in terms of universal service), 2. competition (by requiring enough 
private risk), 3. innovation (as the deployment of a new network generates opportunities on 
services and applications level) and 4. social benefit (benefit for other sectors of society). To 
ensure this, four elements should be included in the mechanism: the clear and long-term 
relationship between public and private partners, private equity as part of the funding, main 
objectives defined by the public actor, while implementation decisions left to the private one(s), 
and clear sharing of risk12. 
Assessing the success of deployments 
The most straightforward way to evaluate the success of a project is to verify to what extent its 
goals and targets have been reached upon completion. Even in cases where the deployment has 
not been finished yet, if information that monitors the construction pace is available, 
measurements of the quality of progress can be obtained. In all cases, the project goals, partial 
or whole, can be assessed.  
                                                 
11 OECD, “The role of communication infrastructure investment in economic recovery.” 
12 Falch, M., & Henten, A. “Public private partnerships as a tool for stimulating investments in broadband.” 
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Where government participation is present, the drivers for investment are grounded on 
expectations of social return and economic benefit in the medium-term. Stakeholders in the 
deployment of an NGA network want to see construction deadlines met and targeted 
households reached. We are therefore relying on “coverage” (target and actual) as one indicator 
of the degree of success in meeting the goals. 
It has also been recognised that private investment would not be able to provide a high-speed 
infrastructure before a desired point in time. In particular, due to the uncertain nature of NGA 
returns, the increasing demand for broadband services, and government goals for the 
reduction of the digital divide13 several regional European governments have invested in 
deployment of NGAs. Timing becomes then a pressing factor as government need to deliver 
on their broadband plans. In our assessment such need is represented on the speed of 
deployment (relative to targets) as another indicator included in our analysis. 
A third aspect in the assessment is the level of risk involved in the deployment of an NGA. 
When the vehicle to expand broadband is a PPP one defining characteristic of the agreement is 
risk-sharing and the type and amount of risk transferred to the private partner shape the 
contractual relationship. Risk transfer is inherently linked to PPPs as part of the investment risk 
that should be borne by the private party. Beltrán14 argues that “it is the degree of risk transfer 
from the government onto the private party that determines the real nature of the contractual 
relationship between them”.  
Lacking accurate data about the financials of the cases analysed here, our approach is the 
identification, not the calculation, of the risk type involved in each of the investment 
                                                 
13 Nucciarelli, A., Sadowski, B. and Achard, P. “Emerging models of public-private interplay for European 
broadband access: evidence from the Netherlands and Italy.” 




mechanisms used by the broadband initiatives. We use a categorisation of risk advocated by 
OECD15, which first divides risk between commercial risk, on one hand, and legal and political 
risk, on the other. In turn, commercial risk is further split into demand and supply risks. The 
former refers mainly to changes on the consumer side such as uptake and use of broadband 
services, as well as other commercial offers of substitute and complementary services, and 
financial risks affecting demand. The latter, intimately linked to the “ability of the private 
partner to deliver”16 and is divided into of construction risk – risks mainly associated with the 
availability and costs of inputs - and operation risk. In our descriptive assessment, we address 
the components of commercial risks.  
Technology – Policy – Market interaction framework 
Although the development of new products and services is facilitated by technology, they only 
make it into the market when demand for them has built up. Similarly, if market dynamics do 
not provide enough incentives for operators to, for instance, adopt new technologies and 
upgrade the networks, government intervention in the form of acts, laws or regulation could be 
justified. Finally, markets don’t develop or evolve independent from policy decisions or 
technological innovations. 
As such, the studied fibre deployment cases should be investigated within a framework that 
uses these three domains: technology, policy and market. Following the research by Melody 
(2013), who identified the impact of technology through applications, the impact of markets 
through services and the impacts of policy through the regulations, this paper uses the 
interaction between technology, policy and the market to describe how decisions on the 
                                                 
15 Originally presented in Fourie, F. and Burger, P.  Ibid., 7.  
16 OECD, “Public-Private Partnerships: In Pursuit of Risk Sharing and Value for Money.” 
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financing structure of the new deployments impact their performance as measured by a variety 
of criteria both in New Zealand and European cases as displayed in Figure 2. 
The technology pillar groups all innovations, both in network upgrades and applications and 
services development, not limited to the telecom sector only. Within the scope of FTTH 
networks, it includes the choice of network topology (Point-to-Point P2P or Point-to-
Multipoint P2MP), network architecture (Active Ethernet or Gigabit Passive Optical Network 
(GPON)), deployment method (aerial or buried), equipment innovations (e.g. on ONT or OLT 
side), etc. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here   
 
The policy pillar comprises all laws, guidelines, regulations and directives that impact the 
deployment of FTTH either directly or indirectly. They can be made on local, regional, national 
or international level. Examples include wholesale price regulation, competition law, Digital 
Agenda guidelines, etc. 
The third and final pillar, the market, combines all commercial and strategic decisions, both by 
the end-user and by the industry players itself. Examples include the customer’s decision to 
take up on a fibre connection, the retailers’ service offers in terms of speeds and caps and the 
NGA platform’s wholesale tariff structure.  
Next we will link the Technology-Policy-Market interaction framework used for analysing the 
cases to both factors of characterization and indicators of performance to evaluate the success 
of PPP in the deployment of fibre access networks. By focusing on the decisions made by actors 
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in the three different pillars of the framework, the effect of their decisions on the other pillars 
can be studied, and possible interaction identified. Applying the framework on the financial 
decisive phase of different FTTH initiatives across New Zealand and Europe, allows analysing 
both the drivers behind implementing a certain investment model, as well as the success of that 
model on the specific initiative. 
A nationwide public-private partnership in New Zealand 
New Zealand government committed NZD $1.5 billion to a FTHH network aimed to reach 
75% of households and businesses, an initiative known as the Ultra-Fast Broadband network17. 
The remainder is to be served mainly by the Rural Broadband Initiative, through investment in 
wireless connectivity and VDSL connections. Crown Fibre Holdings (CFH), a publicly-owned 
company, was created to manage the investment funds.  In 2017 CFH denomination was 
changed to Crown Infrastructure Partners (CIP) Limited, expanding CFH’s initial purpose18.  
A tender process saw four private companies win shares in the total investment funds to deploy 
the UFB. Three of these four partners are known as Local Fibre Companies (LFCs) and will 
eventually own and operate the network on a wholesale-only basis. They are: NorthPower 
Fibre, UltraFast Fibre, and Enable Services. Chorus, the fourth and largest partner established 
from a demerger of Telecom New Zealand into a wholesale company owning the network 
(Chorus) and a retailer (Spark), is not a LFC but instead CIP invests directly in it in the form 
of non-voting equity and debt securities. 
                                                 
17 Sadowski, B., Howell, B., & Nucciarelli, A. “ Structural Separation and the Role of Public-Private Partnerships 
in New Zealand's UFB Initiative.”; Crown Fibre Holdings, “Ultra-Fast Broadband for New Zealanders.”  
18 As read from https://www.crowninfrastructure.govt.nz, the redefined purpose includes “investigating and 
implementing commercial models, including those that will enable co-investment from the private sector or any 
other sector, to achieve the Government’s objectives for the deployment of water and roading infrastructure to 
support a timely increase in housing supply”. 
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 The PPP was structured in two different models: the “funds-recycling” model with the LFCs, 
and the “investment” model with Chorus. The contract with the LFCs is based on the recycling 
of capital in which CIP funds the fibre passing (the dark fibre, Layer 1 network deployed along 
the streets) and when a customer shows interest to subscribe to fibre services the LFC then 
funds the drop section (from the street to the customer’s premises). A subscription-based retail 
commercial relation then starts between the customer and a retail service provider, which in 
turn pays for capacity to the LFC at wholesale prices. This income is then used by the LFC to 
buy a share in the UFB network (so far owned by CIP), gradually acquiring ownership of the 
entire network as services are deployed. CIP in turn can re-invest the regained funds in network 
deployments elsewhere. The government’s UFB network initiative could be described as a 
‘reverse PPP’, where the government initially owns the PPP entity, takes risk and provides seed 
capital to private-sector partners to build the network, and then eventually sells out to private-
sector partners19. 
The contract signed with Chorus is different in the sense that CIP invests directly in Chorus as 
a company, but Chorus bears the main risks of the uncertain demand uptake. In return for this 
government loan, Chorus has to comply with specific coverage and uptake goals, set on 
milestone dates. Regulatory risks manifested in the changes to the regulation of the copper 
network, which led to a major change in Chorus composition of ownership with government 
investment funds replacing foreign capital20. In addition, the government has retained the 
power to exert control of Chorus if the provider does not meet its targets21. 
                                                 
19 Howell, B. and Sadowski, B. “Anatomy of a Public-Private Partnership: Hold-up and Regulatory Risk in an 
NGN PPP.” 




Australia’s National Broadband Network  
The National Broadband Network (NBN) in Australia was originally conceived by the Labor 
government in 2008 as it sought to control Telstra’s domination of the last-mile infrastructure 
in the emerging market of fixed broadband, responsible for Australia's low rankings in the 
OECD charts on broadband uptake and pricing throughout the 2000s. What was proposed as a 
nation-wide, high-speed FTTP network with an initial estimate of AUD $42 billion turned out 
to be grounds for a heavy political fight.  In 2009 the government established NBN Co to build 
and manage the fibre deployment; as fibre was expected to be rolled out and copper 
decommissioned, NBN Co would eventually become the sole provider of wholesale services 
to retailers and other interested parties. NBN Co planned to offer speeds of up to 100 Mbps in 
towns with populations larger than 1000, comprising 93% of Australian premises, by 2021. In 
2011 the cost of building the NBN was revised down to AUD $37 billion and the purchase of 
Telstra’s copper network for additional AUD $11 billion was announced. The deal with Telstra 
would gradually shut down its copper infrastructure, moving almost 10 million customers to 
the NBN. 
With mounting pressure from the opposition ever since Labor announced its investment in the 
NBN, the largest infrastructure project in Australia’s history, the landscape radically changed 
when Labor lost the 2013 election to the Coalition, a political force gathering conservatives 
and liberal democrats. Overnight, the Coalition set itself to change the investment plan for 
NBN. The first two years of Coalition-run NBN were spent in redefining the character of the 
network in terms of the deployed access technology. From the original 93%-covered FTTH 
network, in 2017 NBN coverage plan is a mix of the following technologies: 18% of premises 
with FTTP, 25% on HFC, 18% served by Fibre to the Distribution point (like fibre to the 
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basement of an apartment building), 33% with FTTN22 , 3% with fixed wireless technology 
and the remaining 3% with satellite. Minimum connection uplink rate is 25 Mbps, such as in 
satellite, with speeds going up to 1 Gbps on FTTP. 
NBN Co's access service encompasses several classes of services; among those are the bit-
stream services, traffic classes, telephony capability, multicast, service operation, 
administration and maintenance, and physical interconnection agreements. The network must 
provide wholesale access service to any retailer wanting to offer services to end user. 
The case of Stokab in Stockholm 
Driven by the incentive to increase the economic attractiveness of the region of Stockholm, the 
city decided to invest in a FTTP deployment. Stokab, founded in 1994, is a public company, 
100% owned by the city of Stockholm, and was established to deploy a dark fibre access 
infrastructure to all businesses and households in the Stockholm region. The company was 
founded as a public infrastructure company (comparable to other public firms responsible for 
road, railway etc.); all the development, deployment and operations is in direct hands of the 
company, no outsourcing is done. As the deployment started before the EU State Aid regulation 
was established, its public involvement was not questioned. 
In its initial phase, the network rollout was financed by publicly-backed loans. As a first goal, 
the network aimed at connecting mainly public and educational institutions, but was quickly 
expanded towards private businesses, which requested to be connected on the dark fibre 
circuits. Although being a public company, taxpayer’s money was never used. Instead, the 
initial €300 million investment was based on loans backed by the city of Stockholm, while the 
customers’ revenues provided the necessary funds for a later expansion of the network. Note 
                                                 
22 FTTN corresponds to VDSL, but achieved bandwidth speeds depend on the area. 
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that about 50% of Stokab’s revenues flows from direct business customers23 (e.g. banks, 
schools, etc.). Stokab reached a breakeven point in 2001, and is now a profitable company, 
although the majority of their profits is still re-invested in maintenance and further expansion 
of the network. 
As in the first years, the deployment was mainly focused on larger businesses and public 
buildings, the speed of deployments (in terms of buildings passed) was not very high. The 
rollout speeded up drastically when the focus shifted to connecting more residential users, in 
the beginning of the 2000s. In mid-2013, 90% of households and 100% of businesses in 
Stockholm had access to the fibre network. The goal of creating ultrafast reliable connections 
to the highly knowledge-intensive region that would “meet future communications needs, 
stimulate competition, promote diversity, offer freedom of choice and minimise the need for 
excavation”24, has definitely been reached. Stockholm is now home to a number of successful 
international companies (e.g. Skype, Spotify and Transmode), all of which were attracted to 
the “most densely fibred city in Europe”. 
Deployments in the Netherlands: the case of Amsterdam 
In the case of Amsterdam, the city wanted to explore the importance of high-speed connectivity 
to the economic well-being of the city, and launched a formal investigation into the best way 
to proceed. Based on the outcome of several studies with and without the collaboration of the 
national incumbent, KPN, and the local cable operator, UPC, the municipality decided to create 
a public-private partnership (PPP) to invest in a passive fibre infrastructure. This PPP, GNA 
(Glasvezelnet Amsterdam BV) was incorporated with three groups of investors — the 
municipality itself, the housing associations and the private sector— each investing €6 million 
                                                 
23 Broberg, A., “Challenges for an open physical infrastructure provider.” 
24 Stokab, “This is Stokab.” 
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in return for a one third stake in the company. Another €12 million in funding was provided as 
debt financing, bringing the total investment to €30 million. Although GNA was taken to court 
multiple times by the cable operators, the public investment was eventually allowed under the 
Market Economy Investor Principle: 
- All shareholders should invest under the same conditions in a profitable business with 
an acceptable risk/reward ratio.  
- The network should be operated using the ‘open network’ concept, meaning that the 
wholesale specifies that all service providers must be able to purchase transport 
capacity on non-discriminatory conditions.  
This investment fund of €30 million was used to cover about 40,000 homes with fibre access, 
this process took about 2.5 years and finished in February 2009. Then, GNA announced to 
connect the remaining parts of the city (420,000 homes in total) by 2013, and estimated an 
overall budget of €300 million to do so25. Soon, however, the ownership structure in 
Amsterdam changed, as Reggefiber (a passive infrastructure provider set up by an investment 
company (Reggeborgh)), bought about 70% of the shares, in a partnership with KPN (the Dutch 
incumbent). This evolution made tracking the actual process of the initial project hard. Though 
the project evolved in a different way than it was initially started, it remains an interesting 
example of how a PPP can be set up, and proved an example of multiple other, smaller, regional 
initiatives. 
In general, across the Netherlands, most of the early first Dutch FTTH initiatives were taken 
by municipalities. Later on FTTH deployment in the Netherlands was mainly driven by 
Reggefiber. Since 2014 the Dutch incumbent KPN acquired 100% ownership of Reggefiber.  
                                                 
25 FTTH Council. “2016 FTTH Case Studies Collection: The FTTH Case Study of Amsterdam Citynet.”  
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A community network in Catalonia, Spain 
Guifi.net presents an example of a totally different way of collaboration between public and 
private parties, by implementing a crowdsourced network26. In 2004, the initiative started by a 
group of enthusiasts that wanted to create amateur networking infrastructure, in order to serve 
the more rural areas that were not on the strategic roadmap of the commercial operators. 
Because of its initial success the group founded the Guifi.net Foundation and professionalised 
the offer. Four types of stakeholders participate in the network deployment and operations27: 
- Volunteers, responsible for management of the project, as well as development and 
maintenance of the software tools for network operations; 
- Professionals, who invest in the network in return for fair compensation, and/or use the 
network to offer services (i.e. service providers) in return for a fair payment for this 
network usage; 
- Customers, who use the offered services for a fair fee; and, 
- Public administrations, regulating the public goods, interactions between other 
stakeholders, etc. 
The network governance model is based on the Common Pool Resources framework, which 
assumes that all partners involved agree to and follow up on the same standardized ruleset, yet 
ownership remains with the stakeholder that invested. A specific compensation framework is 
in place to ensure fair (cost-based) payment for invested effort in network deployment or 
operations28.  
                                                 
26 Guifi.net, “The economic project.” 
27 Baig, R., Roca, R., Freitag, F., & Navarro, L. “Guifi. net, a crowdsourced network infrastructure held in 
common.” 
28 Baig, R., Dalmau, L., Roca, R., Navarro, L., Freitag, F., & Sathiaseelan, A. “Making Community Networks 
economically sustainable, the guifi. net experience.” 
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Though the network originally started as a small initiative in some towns in Catalonia, many 
regions in Spain now enter in the Guifi.net foundation for the deployment of their network 
infrastructure. The founders devote the success of the community network to its three 
underlying key principles: open, free and neutral. The openness refers to the fact that everyone 
can gain insights on how the network is built and operated (e.g. all software tools are open 
source), the network is free because access is non-discriminatory, and neutral because any 
technological solution is welcomed in network extensions. 
Mainly private investment in Portugal 
Although most European FTTH initiatives are based on some form of PPP, exceptional 
examples of other financing structures can be found. The main example for a pure private 
investment is to be found in Portugal, where the national incumbent, Portugal Telecom (PT), 
started a GPON rollout to face the fierce competition by the cable operator which could offer 
more attractive video-based offers using its HFC network. At the end of 2011, PT had passed 
1.6 million homes29, in comparison to Vodafone Portugal, who has currently covered more 
than 700,000 homes with FTTH, while aiming for the 1.5 million target by mid-2015 
(Vodafone, 2014). They recently announced that their copper network would be replaced by 
fibre almost completely (93% of homes) by 202030. 
This decision to upgrade to FTTH was helped by the decision of the National Regulatory 
Authority ANACOM who adopted a segmented regulation after a market analysis in 2008. The 
decision determined that access to ducts and associated infrastructure (so-called market 4) 
should be an obligation for all infrastructures (DSL, DOCSIS cable and FTTH), but that a 
                                                 
29 FTTH Council, “Portugal Telecom. Incumbent gains competitive advantage with FTTH.” 
30 Alveirinho, J., “Portugal Telecom An All-Fiber Company In An All-Fiber Country.” 
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wholesale offer (bitstream access, market 5) should only regulated in non-competitive areas. 
In areas with sufficient competition (defined as areas where the percentage of passed homes by 
the main competitor – the cable operator ZON – is larger than 60%), there is as such no 
Significant Market Power (SMP), and according to European guidelines, no need for access 
regulation31. In most of these competitive regions, the combined market shares of ZON and PT 
currently exceeds 85%. 
The upgrade of Portugal Telecom’s network started in 2007 and was a gradual process. First, 
the network was quickly upgraded to DSL and later the copper loop was shortened by Fibre-
to-the-Node installations, with the final step deploying fibre to the actual homes with the GPON 
technology. The choice for GPON was largely based on its capability for broadcasting, as many 
Portuguese homes have multiple TV-sets and thus require enough signals (the analogue TV 
signals could be carried over a third wavelength in the GPON system (RF overlay)). Although 
originally only open to Portugal Telecom’s customers (see above, no enforced regulation), 
Portugal Telecom announced in 2016 that they would also launch a wholesale offer for other 
operators to use their FTTP network32. 
Apart from the pure private GPON investment, Portugal Telecom also signed co-investment 
sharing agreements with Vodafone for easy and cost-efficient upgrading of the mobile network 
to LTE, providing Portugal Telecom with the opportunity of offering quadruple-play for 
competitive prices. 
Finally, in other areas of Portugal (the mainly rural, non-competitive areas), the government 
opened public tenders for the deployment of a wholesale network that would cover 50% of the 
                                                 
31 Anacom, “Mercados grossistas de acesso à infraestrutura de rede num local fixo e de acesso em banda larga (in 
Portuguese).” 
32 Portugal Telecom, “PT moves forward with wholesale offer for fiber network.” 
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targeted population with a minimum download bandwidth of 40 Mbps. In these areas, Portugal 
Telecom deploys an open access network with a wholesale offer for passive access33. 
Comparison of deployments 
For all cases studied here Table 1 summarises the most important decisions as referred to each 
of the three aspects (pillars) considered by the framework. The chronology of the decisions is 
revealed by the bracketed numbers showing first on each table entry, with (1) indicating the 
oldest decision. Table 1 is complemented with Table 2, which assesses the extent to which the 
factors chosen as performance indicators have been met.  
Table 2 displays in two parts: the upper section describes the aspects driving the deployment 
in each case, particularly what motivates governments to act, while the lower section displays 
data on construction targets. In addition Table 3 summarises the information used for 
estimating the speed of deployment, the measurement of comparison for which enough data is 
available. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
   
Insert Table 2 here   
 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 24.  
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Having summarised the main aspects of the country and region cases above within the domains 
of the Technology-Policy-Market framework, we turn now to draw a comparative assessment 
across the groups of international deployments. We first use the data available about 
deployment and time to achieve it to provide a quantitative approach to the speed of 
deployment, before turning to a more qualitative comparative analysis based on the information 
on Tables 1 and 2. 
An estimate of the speed of deployment is obtained by taking account of the number of fibre 
connections reported over a period of time. Although several issues may arise, calculating such 
gradient provides a comparator that allows observing a difference across deployments. The 
difficulties with this approach lie on selecting a meaningful time interval over which 
construction is advanced under somewhat normal conditions (for instance, in accordance to 
plans). Also, when disturbances have arisen that impeded the steady delivery of connections 
passed, the duration of such time interval should be long enough to offset or amortize their 
effects.  
Table 3 displays the values of the number-of-connections-passed to total-time-of-deployment 
ratio as a proxy to the speed of deployment for selected periods of time in most cases discussed 
here. The table also adds a measurement of speed of deployment per 1,000 people to take 
account of the size of the population target for each deployment. 
In spite of the differences in the overall size of each initiative, all deployments are urban as far 
as FTTP concerns. Nationwide deployments take longer and achieve comparatively higher 
deployment rates than their city counterparts.  The Australian and Stokab cases  are presented 
in two stages, with the split in each case corresponding to major policy changes either during 
construction or as a result of an expansion of the original plan, respectively, , as Table 3 shows. 
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These figures alongside the New Zealand ones show how progress in initial build up stages is 
slower than progress at later times. 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Returning to the summaries provided by Tables 1 and 2, New Zealand’s UFB initiative sets 
75% - upgraded to 85% with the addition of the second phase of the project in 2016 - as the 
targeted proportion of households with passing fibre; the coverage goal in NZ is similar to that 
found in Portugal but in local (city) initiatives the targets are much higher. Australia’s plan 
relies on a mix of technologies that aim at 76% coverage using fibre (in different standards). 
Coordination and scale issues cause a nationwide project face bigger hurdles as the geographic 
area to cover is much larger than in the citywide cases.  
City governments can plan for and target almost all premises, especially in conditions where 
population density is rather high, 4,892 and 3,597 people per sq. km in Stockholm and 
Amsterdam, respectively34. An increase in population density leads in general to a decrease in 
network deployment cost35. In spite of its lower population density - 17 people per sq. km, and 
also because of that, New Zealand did not commit to a higher target. Neither is the rural part 
of the country targeted by the Portuguese plan, at least not at the present stage. New Zealand’s 
UFB original decision to only reach 75% of population was based on a cost-coverage trade-
off, one that a smaller scale deployment with less cost per home passed would not have to face. 
On the other hand, a governmental initiative would normally be expected to focus more on 
                                                 
34 Wikipedia, “Population density of European cities.” 
35 Van der Wee, M. et al., “Evaluation of the Techno-Economic Viability of Point-to-Point Dark Fiber Access 
Infrastructure in Europe.” 
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universal coverage, thereby making sure all households are offered the ability to connect. In 
the case of New Zealand, the Rural Broadband Initiative – a complementary deployment to 
UFB - targets this goal, albeit using less costly (VDSL and fixed-wireless) solutions. 
Though the Australian case is clearly steered from the policy corner (as all major decisions in 
the NBN project are initiated and managed by the government, leaving not much space to the 
market component), this also presents its most important hurdle. The political disagreement 
between major political forces changed the deployment plans several times, leading to 
ambiguity. The original plan recognised the geographical hurdles and decided that 7% of 
households would not get fibre; the 2013 election brought in a new government, which had 
been acutely critical of the original proposed NBN’s targets, resulting in a major revision of 
the project’s targets and technologies of choice.  
In terms of the speed of deployment, New Zealand’s CIP reports show that deployment has 
consistently surpassed the established targets and, overall, the project is on track to be finished 
earlier. In spite of the controversial review of the price of unbundled copper lines by the 
Commerce Commission with expectations that such decision could impact the deployment in 
areas served by Chorus, reports indicate that no delays are now forecast.  
In Amsterdam, the cable (DOCSIS) operator UPC took the municipality’s investment plan to 
court, because it was said to distort a well-functioning market. Although granted in the end, 
these court processes delayed the entire project significantly, and as such had a massive impact 
on the termination dates.  In Stockholm, the initial network deployment was not set at a target 
speed of deployment, but was rather adjusted to market demand. Now that the network is 
operational and mature, targets are being set to connect the remainder of the homes.  
With the exception of Australia’s NBN, the fibre deployments have proven effective when 
government was or has been involved. These cases show an on- or above-target speed of 
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deployment, with a warning message about how regulatory uncertainties may have a delaying 
effect on the progress of the deployment. In the case of Portugal, targets are more than met, 
and before target date, but as private operators not always disclose their goals, it is difficult to 
draw robust conclusions here. 
Evaluating the links between the investment mechanism, the initiative drivers and the risk 
transfers reveals a strong relationship between the social-benefit driver and the investment of 
public money. In Australia, New Zealand and Amsterdam, the drivers followed the results of 
reports denoting the importance of broadband to society36, and in the latter two cases a PPP 
with significant private risk (equal private/public risk in Amsterdam) was used as an investment 
vehicle. In Stockholm, the city reacted to a request from businesses to be connected on a very 
high-speed, technology-neutral network. The investment there was fully public (publicly-
backed loans) but the deploying company, Stokab, was set up to achieve return on investment 
rather quickly. In Portugal the driver was set by the market (emerging competition), and hence, 
the reaction to invest was also fully private. In conclusion, a competition driver is followed by 
a market response, a demand driver can be answered by a market or a public response, and a 
societal driver influences policy, the pillar that then leads the initiative. 
As per the choice for either a purely public or a PPP investment, the link to the driver is less 
clear. Here, a significant influence of regulation on the policy pillar can be identified. For 
example, in the case of Amsterdam, purely public investment was not allowed, whereas 
alignment of the investment and sharing of the risk was a necessary condition for public 
involvement. One can tentatively conclude that the driver is crucial for the choice of investment 
mechanism, but the magnitude of public involvement is largely defined by regulatory rules. 
                                                 
36 Department of Broadband, “National Broadband Network: Regulatory reform for 21st Century broadband”; 
Amsterdam, “Beleidsissues ten aanzien van ‘glas-naar-de-meterkast’” ; The New Zealand Institute, “Delivering 
on the broadband aspiration: a recommended pathway to fibre for New Zealand.”. 
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How the network is actually deployed and services are offered (technological pillar) is also 
impacted by the market and the policy pillars, as the cases show. The Australian approach fully 
publicly supported “open access”, which means any retailer can purchase wholesale service 
from NBN and start to provide broadband-supported services. It is also the case of publicly 
backed network deployments under PPP scheme, which obliges in all cases an open-access 
network to be deployed, albeit on different layers. In all three cases (Stockholm, Amsterdam 
and New Zealand), the company or companies deploying the network cannot offer services 
directly to residential end-customers, but lease access (on a dark fibre or bitstream layer) to 
service providers, who then trade with end-users. In Portugal, the situation is completely 
different: not only is Portugal Telecom operating as a service provider as well (no open access), 
it is also fully vertically integrated, not even having to unbundle its network. 
Considering the topology deployed (P2P or P2MP), it is harder to draw conclusions about 
impacting factors from the policy or market side. In general, open access is easier to be offered 
on a P2P network (one dedicated fibre per end-user is available), and therefore public parties 
tend to support P2P deployment more. In New Zealand however, cost considerations changed 
this initial idea towards a GPON deployment with a limited percentage of P2P access that 
should be granted upon request. 
Of course, this topology decision also impacts the amount of risk incurred, as deploying P2P 
is more expensive, but does not generate significantly higher revenues from most (residential) 
users. The latter allows us to claim a link is found between the deployment decision and the 
investment mechanism. On the other hand, P2P allows for easy dark fibre access, which was a 
crucial factor in the topology decision in Stockholm, as up to 50% of Stokab’s revenue comes 
from business customers (banks, media companies, etc.), who lease dark fibre directly (so 
bypassing service providers).  
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Conclusions and recommendations 
Although is it generally recognised that the next step in broadband networks is the evolution to 
NGA, with a strong preference for FTTP networks, the investment required to actually deploy 
these networks is regarded as too high by many current telecom operators. As the importance 
of fast and reliable broadband to society and economic growth has been proven, more and more 
public actors decide to step in by investing in NGA networks; the ensuing projects, either local, 
regional or national, face multiple constraints, from capped budgets to regulatory norms to 
international trading and investment agreements.  
This paper provided an extensive descriptive analysis of 6 different NGA deployment cases 
worldwide and studied the investment mechanisms used in these cases, with a focus on Public-
Private Partnerships, by investigating the technology, policy and market interactions, and 
evaluates the success of the deployment in terms of deployment speed and coverage. 
In general, our analysis showed the importance of the policy pillar in the deployments studied, 
be it as full investment, participation in a PPP or indirect aid in the form of regulatory holidays. 
The policy pillar furthermore showed to impact the technological pillar significantly, in 
obliging open access on a dark fibre (P2P topology) or bitstream (P2MP topology – GPON 
architecture) layer. The impact of the market pillar is limited in case of a public investment or 
PPP, but significant in the case of a private deployment, as there, the competitive threat 
provided a driver for investment. In all cases, the initiative lies with the policy or market pillar, 
and the technology pillar follows. In cases where the market takes the initiative, the technology 
pillar is less restricted than in policy-led cases. 
The coverage targets are higher (in percentage of households) in smaller-scale deployments, as 
the range of cost per home passed is smaller and as such provides for easier planning. Although 
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it could be expected that a government-driven deployment would target 100% of population 
(as to cancel out the digital divide), cost-coverage trade-offs have reduced this target, at least 
for FTTH coverage. In terms of speed of deployment, publicly-backed initiatives tend to 
achieve on or above targets. 
Although the described cases here follow different approaches, Public-Private Partnerships are 
identified as a very promising option, implemented e.g. New-Zealand, Amsterdam and 
Stockholm. The main advantage of a PPP is probably that it combines the strengths and goals 
of public and private players. Public players reduce the risk for private players, and at the mean 
time make sure that the offers that are put on the market are fair and reasonable. Private players 
see a more reliable business case, but are still driven to employ their technical knowledge 
strengths to the maximum in order to minimize their own risk and ensuring sufficient return on 
investment. 
Evaluating the success of NGA and FTTH deployments of course goes beyond assessing the 
coverage and speed of deployment. The work in this paper could be further extended towards 
including other evaluation characteristics, to fully investigate the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the cases. Effectiveness denotes whether the set goals are reached, and can span 
characteristics ranging from target coverage and speed of deployment, to uptake and envisaged 
return on investment. Efficiency measures the way the goals were reached, which includes 
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Figure 2: Technology - Policy - Market Interaction Framework 
 
Table 1: Overview of the most important impacting decisions using the three-pillar framework on regional and country cases 
Decisions New Zealand Australia Stockholm,  
Sweden 
Amsterdam,              
the Netherlands 
Catalonia, Spain Portugal 
Policy pillar  (1)Government  
investment  
(1) Initiative by 
government party 
(6) Major changes when 
coalition took power 
(2) Foundation of 
Stokab 




(2) Initiatives from 
local citizens 
(3) Common Pool 
Resources 
framework 
(2) No unbundling 
obligation 
Market pillar  (5) Demerger of 
Telecom 
(2) Wholesale only 
(2) No competition on 
infrastructure 
(3) Wholesale only 
(4) Buy-out of Telstra´s 
network 
(1) Demand from 
business users 
(3) Dark fibre only 
(2) Taken to court by 
UPC 



















(4) Bitstream access 
(5) 93% FTTP 
(6) Mix of  
18% FTTP   
25% HFC,  
18% FDp 33% FTTN, 






(4) Technology mix, 
depending on the 
area 
(3) Gradual upgrade 




























Table 2: Factors characterising and indicators comparing the different case studies 
Factors and 
indicators 
New Zealand Australia Stockholm,  
Sweden 
Amsterdam,              
the Netherlands 
Catalonia, Spain Portugal 
Initiative 
drivers 








attractiveness of the 
region (businesses) 




PT’s response to 
increasing 
competition from 
the cable operator 
Investment 
mechanism 




















Mixed model of risk 
transfer 
NBN Co is sole 
provider 







LFCs assume ‘drop’ 
construction risk 












LFCs not exposed 




Chorus risk reduced 
by 0% interest loan 
from government 
NBN Co takes 
100% demand-
side risk 
Stokab takes 100% 
demand-side risk 
Parties assume risk 
by equal parts 





75% of target 
households,  
100% of priority 
users  
(Mid-2017) 
As of Oct 2017 
3M connected 
out of 6.2 M 
ready to connect. 
90% of HH, 100% 
of businesses  
(May 2013) 













75% of population 
mainly urban 
76% of 
households to be 




100% of Stockholm  
(dense) urban 



























passed per day) 
Speed of 
deployment per 
1,000 POP (ii)  
New Zealand UFB Jan-11 
Dec-12 
131,000 272.9 0.058 
  Jun-14 
Dec-17 
750,000 872.1 0.186 
Australia NBN (iii) Jan-10 
Dec-13 
207,000 215.6 0.009 
All technologies Jan-14 
Mar-18 
6,600,000 6470.6 0.268 
FTTP (only) Jan-14 
Mar-18 
1,425,000 1397.1 0.058 
Stokab Jan-07 
Jun-09 
95,000 158.3 0.167 
  Jul-09 
Dec-12 
300,000 357.1 0.376 
Amsterdam Nov-06 
Feb-09 
43,000 71.7 0.094 
Portugal Oct-15 
Sep-17 
1,500,000 3125.0 0.303 
(i) Work month is 20 days 
(ii) Population is either country total or city total 
(iii) Australia’s NBN has been a mixed-technology project. Fibre deployment switched from 100% FTTP to an assortment of FTTX in 2014.  
Sources: New Zealand CFH; Australia NBN Co; Fibre to the Home Council Europe; Stokab.se; PT Portugal. 
 
 
 
